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The Collegial Chief
Justice Max Baer*
After being elected to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, I faced
the daunting but thrilling task of transitioning from trial court
judge to Supreme Court Justice. The process, however, was rendered inordinately easier by the benevolence of then-reigning
Chief Justice Ralph J. Cappy. 1 As one of the acknowledged titans
of the Pennsylvania bench, the Chief surely could have been gracious and warm without expending much of his precious time or
energy. In fact, he was so much more. The day after the election,
he telephoned and invited me to his chambers. Not surprisingly to
anyone who knew his personality, he gladly revealed the secrets of
his well-run office and explained the steep learning curve that
new justices experience in becoming familiar with the variety of
topics covered in the opinions, as well as the intricacies of the
various dockets, committees, boards, and commissions. He generously offered me his chamber's allocatur reports, and, before our
first argument session, his bench memos, so that my clerks and I
could get an idea of what information was useful to the other justices in reviewing requests for allowance of appeal and how to best
prepare for oral argument. He showed me his elaborate system of
colored folders, which remains a rainbow-hued blur to me even
now. While I may not have adopted the intricacies of his filing
and circulation system, I took careful notes of his advice. The
Chief was even kind enough to offer a couple of his very precious
employees to assist me in being successful on our Court. To this
day, my chief law clerk, who worked for Chief Justice Zappala and
Chief Justice Cappy, remains a close adviser and friend.
Beyond the nuts and bolts of the filing systems, reports, and
bench memos, and beyond his willingness to part with his employees, the Chief spoke to me of his passionate goal for the Court to
become a collegial body that could produce clear majority deci*

Justice, Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

1. I penned this article before Ralph's untimely passing, and what was written to be a
tribute is now, sadly, a memorial. I revised the article only slightly following Ralph's
death, as it was intended above all to extol his unparalleled professional and personal graciousness, and those qualities will continue to burn bright with all who were touched by
this special man, notwithstanding retirement, death, or time's passage.

499

500

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 47

sions. One of the paths to this goal was to rid the Court's opinions
of disparaging comments aimed at justices in disagreement, trial
or intermediate appellate courts, counsel, or the parties appearing
before our Court. I took this advice to heart as I considered my
responses to opinions drafted by other justices and in drafting my
own opinions. Moreover, I respected the Chiefs efforts when he
would write letters asking the other justices to tone down any
questionable commentary. Indeed, he was always quick to revise
his own work if another justice pointed out any incivility. As with
many of his innovations on the Court, civility has been a hallmark
that has endured even after his retirement and, now, his passing.
Moreover, the professionalism in the writing spilled over into personal interactions among the justices and their staffs, allowing the
individual chambers to hold true to their legal philosophies, yet
remain courteous in disagreement.
During those early discussions in my tenure, the Chief also expressed his goal of reducing the number of plurality decisions as
well as splintered decisions in hopes of creating clear, binding
precedent to guide the bench and bar. Too many of the Court's
decisions had been plagued by multiple concurring opinions, which
blurred the holdings without necessarily advancing the law or
adding useful legal analysis. The Chief recommended that I file
concurring opinions only when absolutely necessary to express my
differing view, and to avoid drafting concurrences on minor points.
Of course, he would never have asked that I compromise my views
to the extent of joining a result with which I disagreed, because
that is the heart of judicial freedom. The Chiefs concern was not
in reducing the number of dissents, but only in reducing the number of unnecessary concurrences that dilute the holdings of the
Court. Unfortunately, anyone who has watched the Court of late
may realize that this goal has been more elusive than the goal of
civility.
However, I, for one, took the Chiefs advice seriously and withheld my impulse to demonstrate any alleged intellect by writing
on every case when I differed only slightly with the legal reasoning of the majority, restraining my concurrences to only those
cases where I had a fundamental difference of opinion with the
logic of the decision, but still agreed with the result. As I began to
circulate my first majority opinions, I was quite surprised to find
concurring opinions flying at me from left and right, especially
when they came from the Chief himself. Some of the concurrences
were welcomed additions to my proposed majority opinions, addressing issues I had not encountered as a trial judge, such as the

Summer 2009

The Collegial Chief

501

ever-present appellate waiver issues attendant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, or the Court's long-standing
conflicts regarding layered claims of counsel ineffectiveness in
criminal matters. When possible, I modified my opinions to adopt
the Chiefs and other justices' comments, and I thanked them for
improving my work. Nonetheless, I could not help but wonder if I
was the subject of some hazing ritual for all newbie justices from
'2
the sheer volume of concurrences as well as dissents and "flips. I
was reassured that it was not just me, as I looked at the many
auxiliary opinions streaming into my chambers in response to all
justices' proposed majority opinions.
Although I never quantified the concurring opinions during
Chief Justice Cappy's tenure, I felt that he was particularly quick
to concur, in contravention of his own admonitions. Indeed, in
writing this article (to which I am sure the Chief would have concurred or dissented), I endeavored to determine if this theory was
just in my head. In looking at the statistics, 3 I concurred in only
6% of other justices' majority opinions, while the Chief concurred
in 14% of those opinions. 4 Only one other justice on the Court had
a higher percentage of concurrences. Neither time nor space permits a review of all my majority opinions that provoked a concurrence from the Chief, but I would respectfully suggest that some
were at odds with the Chiefs goal of reducing concurrences to only
2. A flip occurs when a majority opinion is circulated, the case is held for dissent, a
new vote is then taken on the merits of the proposed majority and dissenting opinions, and
a dissenting opinion receives at least four votes. When a case flips, the justice authoring
the dissenting opinion transforms it into the majority opinion, and the justice authoring the
original proposed majority opinion then has the option to revise it into a dissenting opinion.
3. I calculated the percentages by searching Westlaw for the total number of opinions
filed by the Court between January 2004, when I came on the Court, and December 2007,
when the Chief left the bench. I then subtracted the number of majority opinions each
justice wrote (as one can assume that a justice would not concur to his or her own opinion)
to arrive at a number signifying the majority opinions drafted by other justices. After calculating the total concurrences filed by each justice in that same period, I divided by the
number of majority opinions penned by other justices to obtain the percentages of concurring opinions for each justice. Being infamous for my lack of mathematical acumen, I
enlisted my staffs assistance. At this juncture, they demand that I place a disclaimer
herein that they are also lawyers-not statisticians. Nevertheless, after laborious effort,
we believe that our numbers are valid and reflect what we have witnessed on the Court. I
did not calculate dissenting opinions, because unlike concurring opinions, dissents reflect a
fundamental disagreement in the result of the decision, which no judge or justice should
compromise merely to seek a larger majority vote.
4. The Chief concurred in 17% of the cases in which I wrote the majority opinion, but I
may be able to explain this. Ralph and I had a long-running philosophical disagreement
concerning the propriety of policy discussions in the Court's opinions. So, many of the
Chiefs concurrences to my majority opinions were to disassociate himself from my policy
digressions.

502

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 47

those that where substantively necessary. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that, as I spend more time on the Court, I, too, have a
greater impulse to parse words based on my own previous writings
and the personal, nuanced views I have developed. Thus, while I
might disagree with some of the Chiefs musings in my cases, I
cannot deny that his responsive opinions revealed his insight into
the effect that our decisions would have on the body of Pennsylvania law, nor can I deny his careful, nuanced analysis of the facts
and the law of each case.
Without any doubt, I have taken my model for being a justice
and, indeed, an administrative leader, from insights gained by
talking with and watching Chief Justice Cappy. Now that Ralph
is no longer with us, I can confess that I have modified my day-today behavior in deference to the virtue and style I learned from
him. As I am sure many others will comment in this tribute, my
respect for Ralph's intellect, work ethic, personality, and leadership is unbridled. To me, he will always be the Chief Justice. His
service benefitted this Court and this Commonwealth beyond
measure, and improved all who knew him. I have no doubt that
history will remember the five years he served as Pennsylvania's
Chief Justice as a shining moment in the Court's long lineage, and
history will remember Ralph Cappy, the man, as a shining example of what we can aspire to be.

